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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to
U.C.A. § 34a-2-801(8) (a) (1997), U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1996) and
U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(l) (1997) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether Wilner A. Blakely ("Blakely") failed to marshall
evidence in support of the Utah Labor Commission's ("Commission")
finding that there was no medical causation barring appellate
review of the Commission's finding?
Standard of Review: The failure to marshall evidence in
support of the Commission's findings is an issue only addressed
on appeal, therefore, there is no applicable standard of review.
2. Whether there was substantial evidence in support of the
Commission's conclusion that Blakely failed to establish medical
causation?
Standard of Review: The standard of review of Utah Labor
Commission determination is stated in Utah Code Annotated Section
63-36b-16(4) (g) (1997) which provides in relevant part:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following: . . .
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidencetwhen viewed in light
of the whole record before the court;

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-16 (1997)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Blakely claims workers' compensation benefits allegedly

arising out of his work for Salt Lake County ("the County") as a
van driver transporting the elderly.

Blakely contends he

sustained blisters and ulcers on his feet, which resulted in
partial amputation of both feet, as a result of entering and
exiting the van on two separate November days in 1994 and 1995.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
On April 30, 1996 Blakely filed an Application for Hearing

with the Industrial Commission of Utah. [R. 2 ] . On May 16, 1996
Salt Lake County filed an Answer to Blakely's Application for
Hearing. [R. 14]. A hearing was held on January 23, 1997 before
Administrative Law Judge Barbara Elicerio ("the ALJ"). [R.27, R.
716] .
On May 8, 1997 the ALJ appointed a medical panel to evaluate
the medical issues involved in Blakely's claims. [R. 696-697].
The ALJ asked the panel to address, among other questions:
1. Is there a medically demonstrable, causal
connection between the petitioner's foot ulcers and
amputations and his work as a van driver during 1994
and 1995?
[R. 696].
On June 9, 1997 the medical panel responded to the ALJ's
2

request and concluded that: "There is not a medically
demonstrable causal connection between the petitioner's foot
ulcers and amputations and his work as a van driver during 1994
and 1995 . . ." [R. 713]. On July 14, 1997 the ALJ provided
notice to the parties of the Medical Panel Report. [R. 715].
On October 14, 1997 the ALJ, in a written decision, ruled
that Blakely's claim was non compensable because Blakely failed
to establish that the work activity was the medical cause of his
injuries. [R. 725]. Blakely filed a "request for review" on
November 10, 1997. [R. 728]. The County filed a Response to
Motion for Review on December 11, 1997. [R. 787]. On March 19,
1998 the Utah Labor Commission issued an Order Denying Motion for
Review. [R. 789-790].

The Utah Labor Commission

("the

Commission") concluded that:
[t]he Labor Commission agrees with the ALJ's
determination that the medical panel's report is
persuasive on the issue of medical causation. Because
Mr. Blakely has failed to establish medical causation,
his claim for workers' compensation benefits must be
denied.
[R. 789].
On April 1, 1998 Blakely filed a document requesting the
Commission reconsider its Order. [R. 791]. On April 30, 1998 the
Commission issued an Order Denying Request for Reconsideration.
[R. 794]. On May 20, 1998 Blakely filed a Petition for Review of
Utah Labor Commission's Order with the Utah Court of Appeals. [R.
797-798].
3

C.

Disposition in the Utah Labor Commission.
After a hearing and referral to a medical panel the ALJ

denied Blakely's claim for workers' compensation benefits based
on his failure to establish medical causation.

The Commission

twice affirmed the ALJ's finding on medical causation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Salt Lake County Employment.
1.

Blakely was working for Salt Lake County in May of 1994

as a van driver transporting senior citizens to and from the
Friendly Neighborhood Seniors Center. [R. 838-839].
2.

Blakely drove a Ford Van which provided sufficient room

for him to enter and exit the vehicle without difficulty. [R.
843] .
3.

However, in November of 1994 the County assigned Blakely

a new Dodge Van which had less room for him to enter and exit.
Blakely found it more difficult to enter and exit this vehicle
[879-880].
4.

Blakely had to twist out of his seat with his feat to

get out of the van. [R. 843].
5.

After an unusually busy November 1994 workday Blakely

testified that he noticed a blister on each foot. [838, 839,
840] .
6.

Sometime after he noticed the blisters, Blakely sought

treatment at the VA Hospital. [204, 206, 846].
4

7.

Blakely's condition worsened and on December 22, 1994

physicians at the Veterans Administration ("VA") Hospital
amputated his great right toe. [846].
8.

Blakely was discharged on December 24, 1994, but in June

of 1995 his left great toe was amputated due to further
complications. [846-848] .
9.
1995.

Blakely returned to work for the County in September of
The County assigned Blakely a large van with more room.

[R. 851].
10.

Due to a scheduling mistake, Blakely was again assigned

to the smaller Dodge Van in November of 1995. [R. 852, 879].
11.

Again, during a busy day, Blakely claims he suffered

further blisters. [R. 852].
12.

On March 29, 1996 the VA Hospital performed a partial

amputation of the right foot. [R. 852].
B.

Pre-existing Conditions.
13.

Prior to working for the County, Blakely had a nearly

twenty year history of diabetes. [R. 206].
14.

Blakely began insulin injections in 1991. [R. 167].

15.

Blakely regularly visited the podiatry department of

the VA Hospital for ten years prior to the alleged County
accident. [R. 858].
16.

At the hearing, Blakely conceded that prior to his

alleged County injury he had a lack of feeling in his feet,

5

circulation problems and some numbness. [862-863].
17.

Blakely checked his feet for sores or other problems

every night, although he claimed not to recall any sores on his
feet prior to 1994. [R. 858, 859].
18.

Medical records indicate Blakely had prior problems

with his feet. [R. 194, 197, 189].
19.

Medical records also indicate prior use of tobacco and

non compliance with diabetic diet. [R. 165, 168]
C.

Course of Medical Treatment.
20.

Although the alleged industrial event was approximated

at November 17, 1994, the medical records indicate Blakely did
not appear for treatment until December 12, 1994. [R. 204, 206].
21.

On December 22, 1994 Blakely's right great toe was

amputated at the VA Hospital. [R. 215-216].
22.

On June 13, 1995 Blakely had additional surgery on his

foot. [R. 275-276].
23.

On March 26, 1996, Blakely had a partial amputation of

the right foot and a resection of the Achilles tendon. [R. 680682] .
24.

In support of Blakely's claim, Dr. Moritz wrote a note

which reads:
Mr. Blakely is a patient under my care. He currently
has an open wound to his right plantar foot.
This happened due to driving a van for aging center,
when Mr. Blakely stood up and pivoted on right foot, he
broke open an ulcer to planar sub 2nd and 3rd metarsac
phallangiac joint.
6

If you have any questions please call . . .
[R. 321] .
25.

On April 9, 1996, R. Kelley Thueson, M.D., at the

County's request, issued a report based on his examination of
Blakely and his medical records. [R. 328-333].
26.

Dr. Thueson concluded that "[t]he events which occurred

to Mr. Blakely are because of his underlying diabetes, not
because of his job assignment." [R. 332].
27.

On June 9, 1997 the medical panel commissioned by the

ALJ, based on its examination of Blakely and a review of his
medical records, concluded as follows: "There is not a medically
demonstrable causal connection between the petitioner's foot
ulcers and amputations and his work as a van driver during 1994
and 1995 . . . ." [R. 713].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Blakely failed to marshall the evidence in support of the
Commission's findings, as required by Utah case law.

Given

Blakely's failure to marshall the evidence, this Court should
refrain from conducting its own review of the record to determine
whether the Commission's findings were based on substantial
evidence.
Even if this Court were to conduct its own review of the
record, it would find the Commission's findings based on
substantial evidence.

There was substantial evidence that

7

Blakely's work activities were not the medical cause of his
injuries.

The Commission had before it evidence of Blakely's

work activities, his extensive prior medical problems with
diabetes as well as the medical opinions of a physician and
medical panel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BLAKELY FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT HE FAILED TO ESTABLISH MEDICAL
CAUSATION.
Even with the latitude customarily provided pro

se

litigants, the Court should reject Blakely's appeal based on his
failure to marshall all the evidence in support of the
Commission's findings.

See Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp.,

820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991)("Although this Court has generally
been more lenient with pro se litigants and applied established
fundamental rules of law in favor of a litigant who has not
presented them with the precision of an attorney, it would
nevertheless be beyond our role as judges to become advocates for
a pro se party. . . . This Court will not, therefore, address
[pro se litigant's arguments] because it is totally unsupported
by legal analysis or authority.") and State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d
50, 55 (Utah 1993) (refusing to address issues for, among other
reasons, failure of pro se litigant to marshall evidence in
support of arguments).
8
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In t h e instant c a s e , B l a k e l y h a s failed to m a r s h a l l t h e

1

Grace Drilling involved a challenge to an Industrial
Commission award of unemployment compensation benefits. However,
the same marshaling requirement applies to claims for workers'
compensation benefits. Intermountain Health v. Bd. of Review,
839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
S

evidence in

support

of the Commission's Order.

Blakely simply

argues against the conclusions of the medical panel, the ALJ and
other medical records in his brief. [Blakely Brief, 6-14] .

He

does not, as required, marshall all evidence in support of the
Commission's findings, and then explain why this evidence fails
to provide substantial evidence in support of the Commission's
findings.

Evidence in support of the Commission's findings is

addressed in Point II.

Accordingly, this Court should "decline

to disturb the findings made by the ALJ and ratified by the
Industrial Commission."

Intermountain Health, 839 P.2d at 844.
POINT II

THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT BLAKELY FAILED TO PROVE THAT HIS
WORK WAS THE MEDICAL CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES IS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The Commission's finding that Blakely failed to
establish that his work was the medical cause of his injuries is
supported by substantial evidence contained in the record.

The

record contains (1) Blakely's testimony concerning the nature of
his work activities [R. 839-845]; (2) Blakely's testimony about
his pre-existing problems [R. 862-863]; (3) corroborating medical
records of Blakely's pre-existing conditions [R. 32-203]; (4) the
medical report of Dr. Thueson opining there was not medical
causation [R. 328-333]; and (5) the Medical Panel Report opining
there was not medical causation [R. 710-714].
The statutory basis for reviewing a Commission order is
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stated in Utah Code Annotated Section 63-36b-16(4) (g)(1997).
This provision reads:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, • : i 1
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following: . . .
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination o±
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court;
"F--
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disability is medicaliy '.he ^ ^ i

u

of an exertion or :;\ _^:: ;_:^t
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occurred dur::"

Chase v. Industrial

Commission, c _ . . _*
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otherwise that
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-xert : '^n required by his or

¥
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injury UL disability."

v. Industrial Commission, 7/^ r.^u 1 c , 2n
1

r

nllen

/T74

-?.h 1 Q Q ' . further,

-dical causation i s an i ssi le of fact7'' and this Court

"review [s] the Commission'' s findings under the substai i tial
evidence standard."
"Substdii t

J

.i 1

Chase, 872 P. 2d at: 479.
^VIJMI.

t i,

MI

Ii i l,jvii.f
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i a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
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Id

ubstantial evidence is more than

a mere scintilla of evidence though something less than the
weight of the evidence."

Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776
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P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
In the instant case, the Commission's finding that Blakely
failed to establish medical causation is supported by the
following substantial evidence contained in the record.
A.

Blakely 7 s work activities.
Blakely's described the mechanism which allegedly caused his

injury as follows:
My feet would be — I would remove them off of the, off
the gas and off of all pedals, place them on the floor
— which you can't even do with this shoe on now, but I
could at the time because it had flex in it. You place
them on the floor. And then I — because — and then I
would press back against the seat. And I would twist
like this and twist my feet like this. And then I get
them out from under the steering wheel, then I could
step down on the step.
Q.

Uh-huh?

A. You just couldn't move your feet freely without
having pressure against them. And with that pressure I
twisted a blister on both feet.
Q. Okay. Now did you -- your feet were pressed
against the floor of the van or, or -- is that what you
said?
A.

Yeah, the floor of the van, uh-huh (affirmative)

Q.

Okay.

A. Yeah. They would be —
your body out.

you would be pushing to get

[R. 843-844].
The ALJ attempted to get some clarification of Blakely's
work activities:
12

Q. Okay. What part of the foot then would get pressed
against the floor of the van?
A. Well, the bottom «
bottom of the floor.

•.;~ pressed against the

Q, An d your f e e t w e r e f ] a t : i 1 11: i • = • f ] : • : • i
twisting?

11: i e i 1 y c i 1 \ i e i: e

A. Well, yeah, they would be as flat as you could, ci;.
you could be. And then as you twisted and then you -why it would come over to the side of your foot.
Q,

uh huh.

A. Arid then you would twist all the way the rest of
the way out, to where you get them back out under the
steering wheel, because this part of your body had to
go under the steering wheel, till you get them, out and
down on the step.
Q. But the blisters that you had 01 1
you had one on
your right foot, one on, your left foot. They were both
on the inside of the feet, is that right?
A. Yeah, they were on the -- up here, like this.
Because of the pressure, you know, you/',re going out
left.
Q. They were both on the big toe.
• on the inside?

So they were both

Q. Yeah, the big toes were -- close to the big toes.
They were on the side where you would -- where the
pressure points when you would make yon i,r move out.
[R. 844-845].
Comment i U'i

I'II.II*

I , " > 'I'1 « i i|'l-

PUI,

the ALJ found that

>x

the

conclusion regarding the lack of contribution, from the work to be
J ogl c .a 1 , considering the difficulty * u understanding how any
significant trauma occurred, [ s ic; j nase on • •.-- mecl lai i„:i cs : £ tl le
work exposure testified to by the petitioner
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" [R. 725].

The Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[e]vidence of the
ordinariness or usualness of the employee's exertions may be
relevant to the medical conclusion of causation.

Where the

injury results from latent symptoms with an illness such as hear
disease, proof of medical causation may be especially difficult.
Allen, 729 P.2d at 27 n. 9.
B.

Blakely's pre-existing conditions.
The medical records indicated that Blakely had a long

history of diabetes before his employment with Salt Lake County.
[R. 33][medical record of June 29, 1984 indicating history of
diabetes] .

In fact, Blakely admitted he was diabetic and had

regularly received treatment for his diabetes.

Blakely testifie

on cross-examination:
A. . . . I talked about the Ureacin that they had me
use on my feet every night and morning. I talked about
the medication that I took. And the recommendation
that I followed for diet.
THE COURT: Now, let me just ask you for a clarification
on that, Mr. Blakely. Was that prior to the time that
you had any problems, you were advised to do those
things with your feet?
THE WITNESS: Oh, yeah. I have been going to the
podiatry department at the VA Hospital for ten years
every three months. And all they ever had to treat my
at that time, which they do on a diabetic, was trim my
toenails.

THE WITNESS: . . . You have a diabetic clinic that you
go to; you have a podiatry clinic that you go to; you
have an eye clinic you go to. I mean, that's part of
the total treatment. And I have been doing that for
14

years.
[R. 858-859]
The medical records indicate Blakely had prior foot
problems.

In a January <-•],.

-

.-

~ed

that "diabetic footcare Hx [history] of L [left] Hallux
ulcer,

[

indicates

i i i 11 ' I , 19 94
; M preulcerative lesion"

• '--.

v

J

: • I I t,

.- .. ,°' 7 " 1 . I t i s

" r .^e from left Hallux" in a medical

record dated September 9, 19 93.
C"

[big toe]

[R.

. Thueson's report.
After examining Blakely and reviewing his medical records,

Dr.

Thueson concluded that

M

[f]oot problems are a common

c omp 1 i c a t i o n f o r t h o s e s u f f e r :i i i g :i :i a b e t e s

I

u l c e r a t i o n s , subsequent infections, and required surgeries are
directly r.elctL«-M I

i I

I Labels,. " [ r

i '. 1 |

i"n

Tin ieson also

states that " [ i]n my opinion, it is unlikely that assigning a
different voh i l> I

Mi

':ixaminee would have had much bearing on

the outcome of his diabetic foot problem." [R. 3 3 1 ] .
Addressing Blakely's surgeries, Dr

Thueson stated that "I

believe all surgeries performed • : i: i t: 1: Ie e • xai n :i i iee w e r e

i i e c e s s a ry,

and due to his underlying diabetic condition, and had little to
c-: •

i I I i hi

leupons-

.•

e examinee had

documented lower extremity neuropatis ±i.

1

repor ted foo t i nfection and ulceration _i_n

]5

>.\ with his first
-L_/J3,

well before the

examinee's reported job injury." [R. 331-332].
D.

The Medical Panel Report.
The Medical Panel, consisting of Drs. Thomas and Clarke,

concluded that "[tjhere is not a medically demonstrable causal
connection between the petitioner's foot ulcers and amputations
and his work as a van driver during 1994 and 1995 . . ." [R.
713] 2 .
The Medical Panel explained:
It is apparent to the panel that the petitioner had
multiple factors which must be considered in relation
to causation of his foot ulcers. He had long-standing
poorly regulated diabetes. He had an extensive history
of use of alcohol, which contributes to neuropathy. He
has been obese, which adds to the potential trauma to
the feet. He had a long history of smoking, which
contributes to vascular disease. He had
hypercholesteremia, which also contributes to vascular
disease. He had extensive prior recording of symptoms
of neuropathy, and prior indication of vascular
susceptibility and need for special care and treatment.
[R. 713].
E.

Summary of Evidence.
Based on the above-stated evidence, the Commission concluded

that Blakely failed to establish that his work activities were
the cause of his medical problems.
The Commission had before it Blakely's account of the
2

The only medical evidence in support of Blakely's claim
is a handwritten note from Dr. Mark Moritz stating that Blakely
"currently has an open wound to his right plantar foot. This
happened . . . driving a van for aging center, when Mr. Blakely
stood up and pivoted on right foot, he broke open an ulcer to
plannar sub 2nd and 3rd metatarsal phallangial joint." [R. 321],
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m e c h a n i s m for hi s injury.
and c o n f u s e d .

Blakely's account was vague, ambiguous

F r orri t h is a c c o u n t , t h «= I onirril::::: : I o i \ c o i i J d r a t i o i i a J ] y

i n f e r , w i t h t h e other e v i d e n c e , that this a c t i v i t y w a s n o t t h e
m e d i c a l c a u s e c • f BJ akeJ y s :i i 1 ji :i i:y.
The C o m m i s s i o n h a d b e f o r e it e v i d e n c e of B l a k e l y ' s i o n g stai id:i i 1 g b a I:t] = \ i:i 11: i ::i :i abetes

- -".3 e v i d e n c e t h a ~ " floor

p r o b l e m s a r e common c o m p l i c a t i o n s tui those s u f f e r i n g ciaoere.. .
[R

3 31 ]

C o m b i n e this w i t h the fact that P.. a k e l y had p r i o r

p r o b l e m s w i t h h i s feet, [R

1 89, ~

c o m p l i a n c e with d i a b e t e s t r e a t m e n t ,
m e d i c a l recorai .,::_

_,dr.^
'r. "-"99-702].

IT.-..•- _,

:

F u r t h e r , the
.:

mid-December, several weeks after the alleged injury causing

Finally, *ne Commission had the report of both
L :.\

the County's

t he Medical Panel finding no medical

causatic:

stated above, the Medical Panel noted multiple

contributor" factor.0 whi ch led to Blakely's foot problems,
including nistory c: obesity, smoking

UJ<I

[

1. I y .ululated

diabetes. [R. 713].
1 evidence in
favor of the Commission's f m a m g an ; tne Commission was well
within

it1, purview in finding against Blakely's claim of medical

] ;

causation3.
CONCLUSION
Blakely failed to marshall the evidence in support of the
Commission's finding of fact that his work activities were not
the cause of his medical problems.

Accordingly, the Court should

not conduct its own review of the record.
Even if this Court were to undertake such a review, there is
substantial evidence in support of the Commission's findings.
Salt Lake County requests the Court to affirm the Commission's
Order.

DATED this A ^ day of Jjfl/ (A% j ^

1998.

OFFICE OF COUNTY LEQAL COUNSEL
/I

Patrick F. Holden
County Legal Counsel
Attorneys for Respondent Salt Lake
County

3

Blakely raises a number of issues in the statement of
issues section of his brief. [Blakely Brief, 4-5]. However, the
County notes that Blakely failed to brief these issues and
therefore, should not be addressed. See State v. Jennings, 875
P.2d 566, 569 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (declining to address issues
listed in statement of issues due to "no legal analysis or
authority stated for these issues . . . " ) .
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ADDENDUM

LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 96413

WILNER BLAKELEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY (SELFINSURED) ,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

Respondent.
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
January 23, 1997 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing
was pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner represented himself.
The respondent
Attorney.

was

represented

by

Jay

Stone,

This case involves a claim for workers compensation benefits
related to partial toe/foot amputations that the petitioner
underwent in December 1994, June 1995 and March 1996.
The
petitioner claims that these amputations were necessary as a result
of aggravation to pre-existing diabetic neuropathy in his feet,
caused by excessive rubbing/pressure on his feet at work in
November 1994 and November 1995. The petitioner claims that the
excessive rubbing/pressure occurred, due to exaggerated positions
that became necessary, in order for him to get into, and out of,
the driver,s seat of the work van that he drove. In support of his
position, the petitioner has submitted the opinion of his treating
podiatrist, Dr. M. Moritz. Dr. Moritz states that the petitioner's
right foot ulceration (leading to the March 1996 amputation) was
caused, or aggravated, by his work as a van driver. The respondent
does not contest that the petitioner was required to drive a van
with limited space between the driver seat and the steering wheel
in November 1994 and November 1995.
However, the respondent
contends that the petitioner's claim is non-compensable, because he
has pre-existing diabetic neuropathy and: 1) this is the medical
cause of his foot ulcerations and subsequent amputations, not his
work as a van driver (per the opinion of Dr. R. Thueson, the
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respondent's chosen physician), and 2) the petitioner's work as a
van driver did not involve unusual exertion, so that it fails to
meet the legal cause standard, applicable where there is a
contributory pre-existing condition.
At hearing, the ALJ noted that there was a medical causal
controversy, as between the opinions of Dr. M. Moritz and Dr. R.
Thueson. The ALJ indicated that she would therefore refer the
medical controversy to a medical panel for additional input on the
issue. The ALJ indicated"that she would address the legal cause
determination, if necessary, in any final order to be issued. At
hearing, the petitioner provided testimony, primarily related to
his work duties and exposure during 1994 and 1995. A medical
record exhibit was admitted (Exhibit D-l) which contains the only
information submitted with respect to the petitioner's pre-injury
medical history. The matter was referred to the medical panel on
May 8, 1997 and the panel report was received at the Commission on
July 9, 1997. The report was distributed to the parties on July
14, 1997, with 15 days allowed for the filing of objections. No
objections were filed and the matter was therefore considered ready
for order as of July 29, 1997.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The first medical records, chronologically, involve a June
1984 admission to the VA Hospital in Boise, Idaho, primarily to
deal with cardiac problems, but incidentally also describing the
petitioner's diabetic status as well. Noted was the fact that the
petitioner had type II diabetes for 14 years at that point. With
respect to his diabetes, it was noted that he had had intermittent
treatment for the disease with oral medication over the past 14
years.
It was noted that he had been instructed in glucose
monitoring, but didn't do it.
It was also noted that the
petitioner had been through diabetic instruction, but had a poor
understanding of his disease and had been poorly compliant with a
diabetic diet. He was informed, at that time, that it was possible
for him to control his diet and get off diabinese as a result.
Medical records for 1986 through 1991 show generally poor
compliance with a diabetic diet and oral medication for his
diabetes. He was finally placed on insulin in 1991 and apparently
had better control of his blood sugar thereafter, but this is not
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always clear in the records. Numbness in the legs and feet are
noted in a number of the records during this time frame, with some
attention given to caring for the feet.
In May 1989, the petitioner was admitted to the VA Hospital
due to persistent vision problems. With respect to his diabetes,
it was noted that he had a 5-year history of diabetic neuropathy at
that time. The petitioner's blood sugars were noted to be in the
250-350 range. It was noted that, during this hospitalization, the
petitioner was non-compliant with the diabetic diet provided him
and that he kept slipping out to eat ice cream and candy bars. The
hospital records indicate that the petitioner was given additional
instruction regarding the results of uncontrolled diabetes.
From 1989 through 1994, the petitioner was seen regularly
at the VA Hospital for diabetic related concerns. Poor compliance
with dietary requirements and poor monitoring of his blood sugar
were often noted, with some notations simply indicating that his
diabetes was poorly controlled. As noted above, the petitioner was
begun on insulin injections in 1991. The petitioner also began
regular visits to the podiatrist during this 5-year period.
Symptoms in the legs and feet were often noted, with note of preulcerative lesions and ulcers noted in 1994.
At hearing, the petitioner conceded that he had sensation
problems, circulation problems and some numbness in his feet prior
to November 1994, when he began driving the van for Salt Lake
County. He conceded that, as a result of his diabetes, he was
under doctor instructions to take very special care of his feet,
using Eucerin lotion every night on them and checking them
constantly for any sores or other problems. He admitted to having
podiatry clinic visits going back 10 years prior to November 1994,
under the VA plan for total diabetic care. However, he recalls no
actual ulcers on his feet prior to November 1994.
After working several volunteer-type jobs with senior
centers in 1993-94, in May 1994, the petitioner was hired under a
"Title 5" training program to drive a van transporting seniors from
their homes to the Friendly Neighborhood Senior Center. This job
averaged 20 hours of work per week and the petitioner was paid
$6.60/hour. The petitioner would drive to the seniors homes, using
a list of addresses he was provided, and he would pick the seniors
up and assist them in getting into the van. When he had picked up
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all on the list, or when the van was full, he would drive to the
senior center and again assist the seniors out of the van and into
the center- Later in the day, when the seniors were ready to go
home, he would do the work in reverse order, taking the seniors
back to their homes. The petitioner stated that the vans he drove
held 13-14 people.
Per the petitioner, he began by driving a Ford van which had
plenty of room for him in between the driver seat and the steering
wheel. However, in November 1994, he was assigned a new Dodge van
to drive, which had minimal room in between the driver seat and the
steering wheel, with no tilt function on the steering wheel. The
petitioner testified that his own personal car has a tilt function
on the steering wheel, which allows him to tilt the steering wheel
up when he needs to get in, or out, of his car. The petitioner
tried to move the seat in the van back, but it would not move back
far enough in order for him to slide into the seat easily. The
petitioner complained to his supervisor, John Hutchinson, regarding
the fact that his stomach nearly rested on the steering wheel, and
he requested that the adjustable tracks for the seat be moved back.
Per Monte Keele, the transportation program manager for the senior
citizen transport, the adjustment of the van, as requested by the
petitioner, could not be easily or quickly accomplished, because
the van was actually owned by the state, and not the county.
Therefore, per Keele, it would have been a complicated process to
get authorization to make adjustments on the van.
The petitioner drove the Ford van, with plenty of room
around the driver seat, from May through October 1994, with no new
problems developing in his feet. However, when he was assigned the
less spacious Dodge van in November 1994, the petitioner stated
that this caused his feet to rub against his shoes excessively when
he had to twist his way in and out of the seat. He stated that he
would twist to the left to get out of the van and then apparently
to the right as he got into the van. He attempted to demonstrate
at hearing how his feet were positioned as he did this. This
demonstration appeared to show the inside of his foot pressed
against the floor, but the petitioner's testimony regarding what
part of his foot was rubbing was fairly unclear.
Per the
petitioner, this became a particular problem on "Thanksgiving
crunch day." On this day, which the petitioner approximated to be
November 17, 1994, there was a special function or meal at the
senior center, related to the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, which
was very popular with the seniors. As a result, the petitioner
stated that he estimated he transported 20-25 seniors on that day,
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resulting in him needing to get in and out of the
50 times. Neither party submitted any records
1994 and thus there is no documentary evidence
respect to the number of seniors transported on

van approximately
for November 17,
to refer to with
that day.

The petitioner recalls noticing blisters just below the
great toe on each foot, on the sole of the foot, on November 18,
1994. He stated that he did not go to the VA until the following
Monday, November 21, 1994.
However, there are no VA records
whatsoever for this time frame in Exhibit D-l (no records from
August of 1994 until December of 1994). The closest records in
time to November 21, 1994 are the admit records for the stay from
December 12, 1994 through December 24, 1994. Those records reflect
that the petitioner was admitted for right foot cellulitis and
osteomyelitis of the hallux of the first metatarsal. The records
reflect that the petitioner first noticed sores right underneath
the right metatarsophalangeal joint 2 weeks prior to admission
(approximately November 29, 1994). There was an initial incision
and drainage procedure performed at the hospital on December 13,
1994, with complete amputation of the right great toe on December
22, 1994. The post-surgical pathology report noted that there were
areas of bony erosion identified, with extensive soft tissue
ulceration and necrosis, likely representing acute osteomyelitis.
The petitioner was discharged on December 24, 1994, but he was
under home nursing care for the next 8 months following the
discharge. He was on IV antibiotics for approximately one month
following the surgery and then had daily nursing care for the wound
and his diabetes, until approximately mid-August 1995. He also had
3 to 5 follow-up visits per month with the podiatry clinic.
In late April 1995 or May 1995, there was apparent worsening
of the left foot ulcer. The petitioner did do some very minimal
volunteer work at a local bank at that time, but he was unable to
make any connection himself with that work and the worsening of the
left foot ulcer. The petitioner indicated that he felt that he had
gone off his anti-biotics at that time and that this was the cause
of the ulcer worsening. An X-ray done on May 22, 1995, was read to
show obvious interval development of osteomyelitis, involving the
region of the first metatarsal phalangeal joint, with concern for
necrotizing fascitis.
A June 8, 1995 X-ray was read to show
progressive destruction and fragmentation of the first metatarsal
head and base of the proximal joint, with associated periosteal
reaction and air in the soft tissues, consistent with
osteomyelitis. The left great toe was amputated on June 13, 1995.

00720

ORDERS
WILNER BLAKELEY
PAGE 6

The petitioner spoke with the county regarding returning to
work, after he was released to do so by his treating physician in
late August 1995. The petitioner had some conditions that he
wanted met before he returned to work. He indicated that he wanted
to drive a van with sufficient room in it, or where the seat could
be moved back, so that he didn't have to wedge himself into the
seat as he had to do in November 1994.
The petitioner also
requested to have a volunteer assigned to him, so that he would not
have to get in and out of the van so much to help the seniors. The
county agreed to provide the accommodations requested by the
petitioner. Keele, the transportation manager, decided that it
would be easier to have the petitioner drive a different van than
to try to refit the state van that he had problems with.
Therefore, the petitioner was simply assigned a van that did not
have the problems the state van had. Betty Gikiu, a volunteer, was
assigned to go along with the petitioner on trips to assist the
seniors in and out of the van. She did not go on every trip with
the petitioner, but went along most of the time.
There is only one notable medical record between September
1, 1995, when the petitioner returned to work (just 10.85 hours per
week on the average, at $6.60/hour) and when the petitioner again
developed an ulcer in November 1995. That record is a November 1,
1995 record where the podiatrist noted that orthotics the
petitioner was wearing were under the wrong feet. He reversed them
with the petitioner noting that they felt more comfortable as a
result. The "Thanksgiving crunch day," November 16, 1995, again
came around and the petitioner believes that he again transported
2 0-25 people on that day.
The respondent disagrees with this
estimate, based on Exhibits D-2 and D-3.
Those exhibits are
worksheets that the petitioner used to determine which seniors
needed to be picked up on several days in November 1995.
Per the exhibits, apparently different seniors went to the
center on different days of the week. Thirteen seniors are listed
for the Mondays in November 1995, ten seniors are listed for the
Tuesdays, and twelve seniors are listed for the Wednesday pickups.
Although D-2 contains the petitioner's worksheets, there are no
handwritten markings on the Tuesday and Wednesday sheets. The
petitioner stated he did not actually work on the Tuesdays in
November 1995 and could not recall if he worked on the Wednesdays
of that month. On the worksheets for the Thursday pickups, there
are a total of 18 seniors listed and there are check marks after
most of the names in the columns for the first (the 2nd) and second
(the 9th) Thursdays of November 1995. At hearing, the petitioner
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was asked whether these check marks indicated that the senior was
picked up. The petitioner indicated that the sheets were not
official records and that the check marks did not necessarily
indicate which seniors were picked up and which were not. At any
rate, there are no check marks at all for Thursday November 16,
1995, the date on which the petitioner feels he again developed an
ulcer related to driving the van. For the Monday pickups only, the
exhibit is the apparently more official county record, indicating
just those seniors actually picked up.
That record indicates
thirteen seniors on the list, but just eight actually picked up.
Based on the foregoing information conveyed by Exhibits D-2
and D-3, the county contends that, on November 16, 1995, the
petitioner actually picked up less than the total 18 seniors that
are listed for Thursday pick-up on Exhibit D-2. In addition, based
on the testimony of Betty Gikiu, the respondent contends that the
petitioner had at least some help with getting the seniors in and
out of the van on November 16, 1995 (she indicated that she did
help the petitioner with this, but he also helped, and got in and
out of the van, as a result) . The county does not contest that the
petitioner again had to drive the more cramped state Dodge van on
that day, due to the fact that the van assignments got accidentally
mixed up. The VA ulcer evaluation work sheet for November 20,
1995, indicates that the petitioner had developed a large ulcer
just below the remaining toes of the right foot. On November 27,
1995, the ulcer was debrided. The December 27, 1995 VA record
notes a neuropathic ulcer on the right foot, in existence for
several weeks. The next record is dated March 6, 199 6 and is a
handwritten note prepared by the petitioner's treating podiatrist,
Dr. M. Moritz. The note indicates that the petitioner had an open
wound to the right plantar foot (sub 2nd & 3rd metatarsal
phalangeal joint) and that it resulted from the petitioner driving
a van for the aging center. It states that the petitioner broke it
open when he stood up and pivoted on the right foot.
The petitioner was admitted to the VA Hospital from March
26, 1996 through March 29, 1996, during which he underwent surgery
for a transmetatarsal amputation of the right foot along with a
resection of 1 cm of the achilles tendon just proximal to the
insertion site. The discharge summary for this admission indicates
that the petitioner had a non-healing ulcer, in the area in
question, for 12-16 mouths prior to the admission (i.e. since
December 1994). It notes that radiographs confirmed spread of the
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infection to the bone including the head and shaft of the third
metatarsal. Per the summary, this finding caused the physician to
decide on the amputation. There are no further VA medical records
dated more recent than the discharge summary.
On April 9, 1996, Dr. R. K. Thueson, an internist, examined
the petitioner, at the request of the respondent. Dr. Thueson
concludes in his report that the direct cause of the petitioner's
foot problems is his diabetes (2 0-year history, with a requirement
for insulin during the last 6 years) and not his driving
assignments.
Dr. Thueson notes that the petitioner has
"significant end organ functions" resulting from his diabetes,
including neuropathy, decreased peripheral vascular flow and
impotence. In addition, Dr. Thueson notes that the petitioner has
several risk factors which would aggravate his neuropathy and
diminished vascular flow, including a history of alcohol abuse and
a 120 pack year history of cigarette smoking. Dr. Thueson notes
that foot problems are a common complication for those suffering
diabetes. Dr. Thueson notes that it is unlikely that assigning a
different vehicle to the petitioner would have had much bearing on
the outcome of his diabetic foot problems. Finally, Dr. Thueson
concludes that the all of the surgeries performed on the petitioner
were necessary due to the petitioner's underlying diabetic foot
condition.
It should be noted that the petitioner was unable to outline
the benefits he sought in relation to his workers compensation
claim. Certainly, all his medical care has been, and will be,
taken care of by the VA, and because of his relatively low wage and
minimal work hours, plus his return to work in late 1995, he would
have only a very minimal temporary total claim. He was off work
altogether from December 8, 1994 through August 31, 1995. He
worked a reduced 10.85 hours per week, at $6.60/hour from September
1, 1995 through December 7, 1995 and then was off altogether from
December 8, 1995 through May 23, 1996. He currently is working
again 20 hours per week, as of May 24, 1996, albeit at a lower wage
of $4.75/hour. The low average weekly wage associated with his
claim ($132.00/week) would also result in a fairly low permanent
impairment claim. The petitioner indicated that he had concern for
his continued mobility and the possible need to revamp his vehicle
in the future to allow him to continue driving. However, the
petitioner was not clear on exactly why this would be necessary and
just indicated he wanted to assure that unexpected expenses, that
might arise due to his foot problems, will get paid, as some are
not paid, like the cost of maintaining special shoes needed as a
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result of his amputations. The petitioner was advised that workers
compensation provides for just a few very specific benefits and
might not cover some of the unexpected expenses that might ensue
related to his foot problems, especially considering that at least
some of his foot problems are the result of a pre-existing
condition.
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT:
The panel consisted of Chairman, Dr. M. Thomas and
panelmember, Dr. D. Clarke. The panel concluded that there was no
medical causal connection between the petitioner's work as a van
driver in 1994 and 1995 and the development of the foot ulcers and
amputations later necessary. The panel concluded that there were
a number of pre-existing factors that led to the development of the
ulcers, including, long-standing poorly regulated diabetes, an
extensive history of alcohol use, obesity, smoking and
hypercholesteremia. The panel noted that, at the time that he was
hired as a van driver, the petitioner would have had a significant
impairment rating for his type II diabetes, due to the fact that he
was insulin dependent and had a history of complicating symptoms.
Finally, the panel noted that there was no good reason to believe
that there was any significant undue trauma to the feet based on
the description of the work duties offered to the panel in the
ALJ's summary.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ adopts the findings of the medical panel to resolve
the medical causal controversy established between the opinions of
Dr. Moritz and Dr. Thueson.
The panel report restates Dr.
Thueson's conclusions that the petitioner had many pre-existing
factors that led to the development of osteomyelitis and the
resulting amputations. In addition, the panel report restates Dr.
Thueson's conclusions that the petitioner's work as a van driver,
even in the cramped van he had to use on one occasion in 1994 and
one occasion in 1995, did not contribute to the need to accomplish
the foot amputations.
Only Dr. Moritz's short one-paragraph
statement indicates any medical causal connection between the
petitioner's work and his eventual need to have the partial
amputations. In light of the fact that it is unclear whether Dr.
Moritz had a full understanding of the petitioner's extensive preexisting history of risk factors and in light of the fact that the
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Dr. Thueson and the medical panel clearly had this history and
relied upon it significantly in making their conclusions, the ALJ
prefers to adopt the majority medical opinion stated by Dr. Thueson
and the medical panel. The ALJ finds that this conclusion is
underscored by the findings noted above, taken primarily from the
medical records, documenting clearly the petitioner's extensive
history of diabetes and other contributory risk factors. The ALJ
also finds the conclusion regarding the lack of contribution from
the work to be logical, considering the difficulty in understanding
how any significant trauma occurred, base on the mechanics of the
work exposure testified to by the petitioner (outlined above).
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the ALJ finds that the
petitioner's claim for workers compensation benefits is noncompensable due to failure to establish medical cause. The ALJ
will not formally address legal cause, as the failure to establish
medical cause makes it unnecessary to do so. Failure of either
medical or legal cause makes the claim non-compensable. Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) . The ALJ will note
that the higher legal cause standard would apply, based on the
clear and significant contributory pre-existing conditions.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petitioner's claim for
workers compensation benefits is dismissed with prejudice due to
non-compensability.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Division of
Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless
received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (3 0) days of
the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to
review or appeal.
If a Motion for Review is received by the
Division of Adjudication within thirty (3 0) days of the date
hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion for
Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A.
Section 63-46b-12. A Motion for Review will be decided by the
Commissioner of the Labor Commission unless any of the parties
requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board
in accordance with U.C.A. Section 34A-1-205 within thirty (30) days
of the date hereof, or in case of a party responding to the Motion
for Review, the request must be made within 2 0 days of the date of
the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication.
DATED this 14th day of October, 1997.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
WILNER BLAKELEY,
Applicant,

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendant
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ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Case No. 96-0413

Wilner Blakeley asks the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's
denial of Mr. Blakeley 's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Was Mr. Blakeley's work for Salt Lake County the medical cause of the injuries for which
he now seeks workers' compensation benefits?
FINDINGS OF FACT
After having reviewed the record in this matter in light of the points raised by Mr. Blakeley's
motion for review, the Labor Commission concludes that the ALJ's findings of fact are supported
by the evidence.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
An individual claiming workers' compensation benefits must prove that his or her work is
the medical cause of the injury for which benefits are sought In this case, the ALJ referred the issue
to an impartial medical panel which examined Mr. Blakeley, reviewed his medical history, and
concluded that his work was not the medical cause of his injury.
The Labor Commission agrees with the ALJ's determination that the medical panel's report
is persuasive on the issue of medical causation. Because Mr. Blakeley has failed to establish medical
causation, his claim for workers' compensation benefits must be denied.
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ORDER
The Labor Commission affirms the ALJ's decision and denies Mr. Blakeley's motion for
review. It is so ordered.
Dated this /T^day of March, 1998.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days
of the date of this order.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
Wilner Blakeley, Case No. 96-0413 , was mailed first class postage prepaid this / ^ d a y of March,
1998, to the following:
Jay L. Stone
Deputy County Attorney
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street, S-3400
Salt Lake City Utah 84190-1200
Wilner Blakeley
1992 South 200 East #B626
Salt Lake City Utah 84110

Sara Jen^/n
Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission
orders\96-0413
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
WILNER BLAKELEY,

*
*
*

Applicant,

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION

*

SALT LAKE COUNTY,

*
*
*

Defendant

Case No. 96-0413

Wilner Blakeley asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its previous decision denying
Mr. Blakeley's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this request for reconsideration pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.O.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Blakeley's request for reconsideration does not set forth any basis for modification of
the Labor Commission's previous decision. Mr. Blakeley does, however, ask the Commission to
refer his claim for mediation under the Commission's alternative claims resolution program.
Having once again reviewed the record in this matter, the Labor Commission remains of the
opinion that Mr. Blakeley is ineligible for workers' compensation benefits, for the reasons set forth
in the Commission's previous decision.
As to Mr. Blakeley's request for mediation, the Commission finds no issues presented by Mr.
Blakeley's claim that would benefit from mediation, particularly at this late stage of the proceedings.
ORDER
The Labor Commission reaffirms its previous decision and denies Mr. Blakeley's request for
reconsideration. It is so ordered.
Dated this JfcTday of April, 1998.

R. t e e Ellertson
Commissioner
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review
with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of the date
of this order.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Request For Reconsideration in the
matter of Wilner Blakeley, Case No. 96-0413 , was mailed first class postage prepaid thisJg/*Bay
of April, 1998, to the following:
Jay L. Stone
Deputy County Attorney
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street, S-3400
Salt Lake City Utah 84190-1200
Wilner Blakeley
1992 South 200 East #B626
Salt Lake City Utah 84110

Sara Jensor
Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission

orders\96-04l3b
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